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TRIBUTES TO CHIEF JUDGE ROBERT C. MURPHY
INTRODUCFION
WILUAM H. REHNQUIST*
I am pleased that the University of Maryland School of Law is
dedicating an issue of its law review to Chief judge Robert C. Murphy
on the occasion of his retirement from the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land. Chief Judge Murphy's service to the State of Maryland has been
long and productive. I am sure that those who are more familiar with
his contribution to Maryland jurisprudence than I am will attest to his
major contributions in that area.
I have known Bob Murphy through the activities of the National
Conference of Chief Justices, where he was a recognized leader and
served as president for a term. He has also been active in the work of
the National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia, and
served as the chairman of its board of directors. He was rightly recog-
nized as a leader among state chief justices, and I am sure that the
nation as well as the State will miss his active participation in the ad-
ministration of justice.
* Chief Justice of the United States.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
THE OPINIONS OF CHIEF JUDGE ROBERT C. MuRiiY
LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY*
The retirement of Robert Charles ("Bob") Murphy as ChiefJudge
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland has produced an outpouring of
tributes and ceremonies honoring the man which rival those honor-
ing LaFayette on his return visit to the United States in 1824. The
Maryland Law Review, by recognizing Bob Murphy's public service in
this issue, takes part in that broad, public expression of appreciation.
I am pleased to have been asked to participate.
As directed by the editors, my contribution focuses on Chief
Judge Murphy's opinions for the Court of Appeals. In the nearly
twenty-five years of his service on the Court, all as Chief Judge, Bob
Murphy authored approximately 550 majority opinions. Their intrin-
sic merit contributes substantially to the jurisprudence of the State
and nation. There are probably no topics known to the common law,
or subjects of legislation by the General Assembly of Maryland, that
have not been addressed in one or more opinions authored by Chief
Judge Murphy. This body of work is even more remarkable when one
considers that it was produced while administering the entire judicial
branch of the government of Maryland without a mishap, or at least
not one that the press ever detected.
His first opinion as Chief Judge, filed October 9, 1972, arose out
of the tension between changing social customs and an established
pattern of conduct-a typical breeding ground for litigation that
works its way to state supreme courts. The case, Stuart v. Board of Su-
pervisors of Elections,' was brought by a married woman against local
supervisors of elections who had canceled the woman's voter registra-
tion because she refused to use her husband's surname and had regis-
tered using her birth-given name by which she was known. After
Chief Judge Murphy's opinion had reviewed the law relating to the
name of an individual, from English times to the then present, the
Court directed restoration to the voters rolls under the name by which
the woman was known.
A hallmark of Chief Judge Murphy's tenure on the Court was his
willingness to write the opinions in cases of great public controversy.
It became clear to me, relatively shortly after my joining the Court in
January 1980, that Chief Judge Murphy did not assign these cases to
himself because of some desire to be in the limelight. Rather, he
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland.
1. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
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knew that these decisions, whatever they might be, would displease a
large segment of the public, and he believed that it was part of the
responsibility of the ChiefJudge to be the lightning rod for any outcry
precipitated by these decisions.
Accordingly, Chief Judge Murphy wrote for the Court:
-when the poorest political subdivisions of the State unsuccess-
fully challenged the constitutionality of Maryland statutes governing
the system of financing public elementary and secondary schools
throughout the State;2
-when landlords successfully challenged the constitutionality of
an amendment to the Baltimore City Charter that had been proposed
by an initiative generated by tenants' rights advocates and that would
have established a system of rent control;3
-when opponents of the construction of two sports stadiums in
Baltimore City* unsuccessfully petitioned to referendum acts of the
General Assembly providing for financing construction of the stadi-
ums through the Maryland Stadium Authority;4
-when the Commissioner of the Division of Labor and Industry
promulgated a regulation under state and federal Occupational Safety
and Health Acts banning, with limited exceptions, smoking in places
of employment, thereby precipitating an unsuccessful court challenge
by businesses, trade associations, and tobacco companies;5 and
-when multiple exceptions were unsuccessfully taken to the re-
spective reapportionments of the General Assembly following the fed-
eral censuses of 19806 and 1990.'
Capital punishment cases also generate intense feelings among
large segments of the public. After Gregg v. Georgia,8 Proffitt v. Florida,9
andJurek v. Texas1" introduced the current era of "guided discretion"
death penalty statutes, Maryland adopted such a statute. 1 Under the
Maryland statute, appeals in cases in which the death penalty is im-
posed, together with a review of that sentence, come directly to the
Court of Appeals."2 Tichnell v. State" was the first death penalty case
2. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
3. See Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 415 A.2d 255 (1980).
4. See Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987).
5. See Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995).
6. See In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 475 A.2d 428 (1982).
7. See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993).
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
10. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
11. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(a), (d) (1996).
12. See id.
13. 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
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in the Court under the new statute. Writing for the Court, Chief
Judge Murphy sustained the constitutionality of the statute and also
began the continuing task of clarifying how the statute operates in the
myriad situations that can arise during these intensely contested pro-
ceedings. Tichnell's case returned to the Court of Appeals on three
subsequent occasions, on each of which Chief Judge Murphy wrote
the opinion. 14
The convictions and death sentences imposed on John Frederick
Thanos were affirmed in opinions written for a unanimous Court by
Chief Judge Murphy. 5
On the Court of Appeals he also continued to define and clarify
Maryland substantive criminal law with the same balance of scholar-
ship and pragmatism that he had displayed as Chief Judge of the
Court of Special Appeals when that court began writing Maryland
criminal law on a relatively clean slate. In the realm of federal consti-
tutional criminal law, his analysis in Smith v. State,'6 holding that there
was no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment through
the use of a pen register,17 was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.18
On certiorari review of a decision by a divided Court of Special
Appeals, sitting en banc,' 9 Chief Judge Murphy, writing for the four-
judge majority in the Court of Appeals, reversed the Court of Special
Appeals and upheld the sufficiency of the evidence of rape in which
the victim had neither been threatened with a weapon nor beaten.20
In addition, of course, every judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney
in Maryland is aware of Chief Judge Murphy's opinion in State v.
Hicks." In that opinion the Court held that dismissal of the criminal
charges is the sanction for noncompliance with the court rule, imple-
menting a statute, that specifies the latest date for the initially sched-
uled trial in criminal prosecutions. The ramifications of the sanction
approved in Hicks in 1979 continue to this day.
14. See State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179 (1986); Tichnell v. State, 297 Md.
432, 468 A.2d 1 (1983); Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981).
15. See Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 576, 625 A.2d 932 (1993); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77,
622 A.2d 727 (1993).
16. 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978).
17. A pen register is a device installed in the central office of a landline telephone
company for recording the telephone numbers of calls made from a particular telephone.
Id. at 159 & n.1, 389 A.2d at 859-60 & n.1.
18. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
19. See Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624 (1979).
20. See State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).
21. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
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Chief Judge Murphy's contribution is equally vast in the field of
tort law. He authored Harris v. Jones,2  which recognized the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and laid down the elements
establishing that tort's boundaries. Speaking through Chief Judge
Murphy, the Court in Adler v. American Standard Corp.23 declared the
tort of abusive discharge to be part of Maryland common law. Adler
has provided lawyers practicing in the labor and human resources
field with full employment, comparable to that enjoyed by tax attor-
neys and accountants following a revision of the Internal Revenue
Code. He wrote in Vance v. Vanco4 that an action for negligent mis-
representation would lie on behalf of an ostensible second wife
against her bigamist husband who misrepresented that he had been
divorced from his first wife. In Jones v. Malinowski,25 after recognizing
a right of action for "wrongful birth"-an action against a health care
provider based upon the birth of a child following a negligently per-
formed sterilization procedure-Chief Judge Murphy set forth the
principles governing the award of damages in such cases. He wrote in
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark6 that when a former husband committed
suicide, thereby prematurely terminating a stream of support pay-
ments to his former wife, the decedent's estate was not liable to the
former wife for the economic loss. He has also written on the distinc-
tion between property damage and pure economic loss in a case in-
volving the death of more than 140,000 chickens due to the failure of
an electric switch," and in a case involving allegedly defective fire re-
tardant-treated plywood used for the roofs of houses. 8
Decisions by Chief Judge Murphy affecting the practice of
medicine have been respectively approved and disapproved by the
medical profession. In Elias v. State,29 speaking for a majority of the
Court, he held that the State had failed to prove that a male physician
had committed a common law battery on a female patient during a
medical examination that included brief touching in the vaginal area.
In Faya v. Almaraz0° Chief Judge Murphy wrote that a negligence ac-
22. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
23. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), answer conformed to, 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md.
1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
24. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
25. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
26. 289 Md. 313, 424 A.2d 744 (1981).
27. See A.J. DeCoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330
(1994).
28. See Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995).
29. 339 Md. 169, 661 A.2d 702 (1995).
30. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
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tion would lie against a surgeon and hospital on behalf of a patient
who had not been informed, before surgery, that the surgeon had
AIDS, but the damages in compensation for anxiety would be limited
to the period from the discovery of the surgeon's condition to the
report of a negative test on the patient.
Sometimes the neutral application of legal principles requires
rulings that are contrary to the sympathy that the facts arouse for the
losing party. For example, in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Doe,"1 Chief
Judge Murphy's opinion explained to two plaintiffs who had con-
tracted AIDS in hospital-administered blood transfusions that they
had no legal action against the suppliers of the blood because, at the
time of the transfusions, the blood products were unavoidably unsafe.
Similarly, writing for a majority of the Court in Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hospital, Inc.,32 he affirmed the circuit court's decision not to
authorize sterilization by hysterectomy of a thirteen year old whose
I.Q. was twenty-five to thirty as a result of brain injuries sustained in an
automobile accident at age five months.
Chief Judge Murphy's opinions dealing with contract and prop-
erty rights include interpreting an insurance policy in an environmen-
tal tort coverage case that was so important that two full pages of the
Maryland Reports were required simply to list the names of counsel."3
He has interpreted a testamentary trust in the light of changes to
Maryland's adoption statute.34 In statute of limitations cases he has
written that the commencement of the running of the statute on the
claim of a savings and loan association against its former directors is
deferred by the adverse domination of the board of directors by the
defendants, 35 but that on the claim of a building owner against a con-
tractor there is no deferral of the running of the statute until all of the
harm has occurred. 6
Chief Judge Murphy's opinions in the fields of administrative law
and local government include County Council v. Investors Funding
Corp., 7 from which I learned, much to my shock as a practicing law-
yer, that a charter county could authorize an administrative agency to
impose civil monetary penalties. In Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commis-
31. 315 Md. 704, 556 A-2d 1107 (1989).
32. 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
33. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993).
34. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Purifoy, 280 Md. 46, 371 A.2d 650
(1977).
35. See Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 635 A.2d 394 (1994).
36. See Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 500 A-2d 641 (1985).
37. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973).
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sioners,38 his opinion resolved an apparent conflict between a local
zoning ordinance and state environmental regulations in favor of the
local zoning ordinance.
If ChiefJudge Murphy were asked to list the five opinions for the
Court that he found to be the most difficult to write, I predict that the
list would include Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc.,39 in
which a rezoning by sectional map amendment in an area of ex-
tremely valuable real estate was challenged on ten separate grounds
by waves of lawyers.
The multitude of legal subjects addressed in Chief Judge Mur-
phy's opinions attests to his intellectual prowess. In an age when the
law is becoming increasingly complex and lawyers increasingly special-
ize in narrower and narrower areas of practice, rare, indeed, is Chief
Judge Murphy's command of federal constitutional law and of the
whole of Maryland law. His opinions uniformly manifest his full com-
prehension of the governing law and of the parties' arguments, no
matter how complex or esoteric the issues.
The end product of the appellate judge's review, research, and
reflection is the written exposition of the facts of the case, the issues,
the decision, and the reasons for the decision. In that aspect of his
work, as in every other aspect, ChiefJudge Murphy excelled. Without
exception his opinions are as lean on verbiage and as sharp in clarity
as the nature of the case permits.
The citizens of Maryland benefitted immeasurably from the serv-
ices of Chief Judge Murphy during his active career. Through the
opinions of this great judge the citizens of Maryland will continue to
benefit, long into the future.
A HumxiL GiANT
ALAN M. WILNER*
To borrow a phrase from Abraham Lincoln, it is altogether fitting
and proper for the Maryland Law Review to devote one of its issues to
Robert C. Murphy, who retired as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in October 1996 after nearly twenty-five years of service in
that office.
The world is very different now than it was in 1926, when Bob
Murphy was born, or in 1952, when, after a clerkship with a federal
38. 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986).
39. 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483 (1977).
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland.
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judge, he began to practice law, or even in 1972, when he was ap-
pointed as ChiefJudge of the Court of Appeals. So much information
flies by so fast that less and less of it is able to be retained; in trying to
keep mentally afloat, we tend to forget our history and lose track of
who our real heroes and heroines are. They become exiled in cere-
bral Siberia as we concentrate on what currently confronts us. As we
enter a new century, we need, every now and then, to stop for a mo-
ment and take our bearings, and when we do, we shall see Bob Mur-
phy as one of the guiding beacons-a visionary who understood well
the function of the judiciary and helped to make and keep it respon-
sive to the public need and to public expectations.
Other contributors to this issue have described some of the cases
Judge Murphy sat on and some of the opinions he authored. I want to
focus on other things, for his true contribution extends well beyond
the opinions that he wrote, important as many of them are.
Before he was a judge, Bob Murphy was a lawyer. I first met him
in August 1965 in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General of Mary-
land. In a rare lapse of good judgment, he appointed me as an assis-
tant attorney general. That office now has about three hundred
lawyers plus a cadre of law clerks, paralegals, interns, and other sup-
port staff. In those days, in addition to the Attorney General himself,
it consisted of one deputy-Mr. Murphy-fourteen assistant attorneys
general, sixteen special assistants (some of whom did the same work as
the regular assistants but got paid less), eight secretaries, one adminis-
trative assistant, and six file cabinets. Other than the Attorney Gen-
eral-Tom Finan-the oldest lawyer was not yet forty.
In terms of raw talent and exuberance, if not in experience, it was
unquestionably the finest law firm in the State. It was so largely be-
cause of Bob Murphy's insistence on picking only the most qualified
people to serve in it and because of his ability to draw the very best out
of those people. He was the one who really ran that office, who
guided the young staff around him, and who set State legal policy. It
was there that I first observed some of his great human qualities-
uncommon common sense and the willingness, on the one hand, to
accept responsibility for any failures or deficiencies, even if caused by
others, but, on the other, to allow his subordinates to take the credit
when things went well. In those days, the State had several cases in
the Supreme Court, and rather than taking those arguments for him-
self, which he had a right to do, he usually shared them with the assis-
tant who worked on the case, to give the young attorney a once-in-a-
lifetime chance to make history.
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People think of Judge Murphy in terms of his appellate experi-
ence, but he was a canny trial lawyer as well. I recall the summer of
1966 or 1967, when a group of rabble-rousing, neo-Nazi white
supremacists nearly caused a serious race riot in South Baltimore and
threatened to hold additional rallies in other parts of the city. The
lead speaker-an itinerant, but charismatic painter from South Caro-
lina-proved himself able to whip up a crowd, and the police were
very concerned about the effect of further demonstrations.
The State filed a complaint to enjoin the group from holding any
further rallies in the city, and in preparation for a hearing two days
hence, we had to figure out a way to overcome the obvious First
Amendment problem that Judge O'Donnell was sure to raise. Bob
Murphy, with his amiable Irish charm, struck up a "friendship" with
the young "philosopher" of the group and, perhaps over a bottle of
good Irish whiskey, engaged him in pleasant dialog as to his views,
which included a "final solution" for various groups of undesirables.
At the hearing, Bob called this young man as the State's first witness,
asked him a few friendly questions, and let him explain to the judge,
in a rambling fashion, what he and his group had in mind. The judge
shook his head gravely as the witness laid out, in some detail, his plan
to murder or exile in leaky boats the Jews, the Blacks, and even the
Italians. When this budding Hitler added the Irish to the list, how-
ever, Judge O'Donnell became visibly incensed, as Bob knew he
would, and we had our injunction. The injunction ran for about
three months, which got us through the summer and early fall. Judge
O'Donnell figured that it would expire before the Court of Appeals
could get around to reversing him.
In 1967, the Court of Special Appeals was created, and Bob was
appointed as its first Chief Judge. The administrative talents he dis-
played as Deputy Attorney General (and, for a short time, Attorney
General) were transferred immediately to the daunting job of organiz-
ing a brand new court, upon which the Court of Appeals immediately
dumped four hundred cases. Bob did everything-from setting in
motion the mysterious removal of rugs and furniture from various leg-
islative and executive offices throughout Annapolis in the dead of
night in order to furnish the court, to hiring the clerical staff, to pick-
ing green as the color of the new Maryland Appellate Reports, to cre-
ating the procedures for assigning and disposing of cases, to his most
important legacy of forging the bond of friendship among the judges
that has remained a hallmark of that court throughout its entire
thirty-year history. In the process, he set the groundwork for what has
19971
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become one of the best and most efficient intermediate appellate
courts in the country.
Few people realize that a great part of modern criminal law and
procedure in Maryland was fashioned by the Court of Special Appeals
in those early days. The State was presented with an explosion of
newly recognized rights emanating from the Supreme Court, and for
the first several years after creation of the Court of Special Appeals,
the Court of Appeals seemed content to allow that court to deal with
those issues. Bob Murphy had a great deal to do with the State's im-
plementation of the new doctrines.
One of the most important tasks he faced was implementing the
right of indigent criminal defendants to court appointed counsel at
the appellate level. There was no public defender system then, so Bob
would call around, importuning lawyers to handle cases, mostly on a
pro bono basis. Several times, he called me. His line, each time, was
that the court had a case of truly special significance, requiring the
thorough analysis that only I could give. Convincing me that I was
Maryland's version of Abe Fortas and that the case was no less impor-
tant than Gideon v. Wainwright,1 I would accept the appointment,
spend hours and hours in research, prepare a brief fit for the
Supreme Court, and travel to Annapolis for oral argument, only to
get, within a week or two, a one-page per curiam affirmance. I am
sure that I was not the only victim of this Murphy malarkey.
Article IV, section 18(b) of the Maryland Constitution declares
that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals "shall be the administra-
tive head of the Judicial system of the State."2 Although that provision
has been in the Constitution since 1944, it was not until Judge Murphy
became Chief Judge in 1972 that it was fully implemented. He under-
stood that there was, in fact, a judicial "system" and not just a collec-
tion of disparate courts, each doing its own thing. He also understood
that the judicial system was part of several larger systems and that it
could not operate efficiently or effectively independent of them. We
take those precepts for granted now, but they were radical thoughts in
1972.
More than any of his predecessors, Judge Murphy made special
efforts to forge cordial relations with the General Assembly. Unlike
the view ofjudges in some other states, he did not regard legislators as
just rank politicians, but saw them as decent, hardworking, and dedi-
cated public servants, who, if educated about the judicial system and
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(b).
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its needs, would respond constructively. He did not leave the presen-
tation of the judicial budget or of other proposals especially important
to the judiciary just to administrative officials, but made it a point to
appear personally before the legislative committees to answer ques-
tions and impress on them the importance of what was being re-
quested. He used his periodic State of the Judiciary addresses to the
General Assembly to lay out both his vision and his immediate laundry
list.
As a result of these and other efforts, the legislature has generally
responded in a reasonable way, authorizing the judicial personnel and
the resources necessary to operate the system effectively. There have
been disagreements and occasional flashpoints, of course, but, largely
as a result of Judge Murphy's wise strategy and innate skill in involving
and educating the legislature and treating its members with respect,
the Maryland judiciary has fared far better than its counterparts in
most other states.
Judge Murphy displayed the same kind of outreach and involve-
ment with respect to the Maryland State Bar Association. In many
states, there is little contact between the chief judge, or the state
supreme court, and the state bar association. That is not the case
here. Judge Murphy both initiated and responded to multiple formal
and informal contacts with the Maryland State Bar Association. He
gave formal addresses at the annual meetings in June; he met privately
with Bar Association leaders to discuss matters of common interest; he
eased consideration by the Court of Appeals of important Bar Associa-
tion initiatives, such as the professionalism course required for new
admittees and the urging of all lawyers to engage in pro bono
activities.
On a number of occasions, Judge Murphy personally intervened
with the governor and the legislature to have necessary funds restored
to the public defender system, thereby saving that operation from ex-
treme hardship. He understood the importance of the public de-
fender system to the operation of the trial and appellate courts and,
therefore, in the interest of the judiciary, went to bat for what is
clearly an executive branch agency.
While reaching out to other institutions, Judge Murphy fully ap-
preciated the responsibility of the judiciary itself to keep current and
responsive to new needs and changing times. In 1981, by administra-
tive order, he created the Maryland Judicial Institute for the purpose
of providing organized, relevant, and high-quality continuing educa-
tion programs for judges. He launched a major effort to investigate,
document, and eradicate gender bias in the Maryland courts. It was
1997] 635
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under his tutelage that the Attorney Grievance Commission was cre-
ated and funded, that sentencing guidelines were established, that the
Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers was revamped, that the
Canons of Judicial Conduct were also substantially rewritten, that
membership by judges in organizations that practice invidious dis-
crimination was prohibited, that a similar code of conduct was
promulgated for masters and other judicial appointees, that the cir-
cuit court clerks' offices were brought under court control and mod-
ernized, that a fair personnel system, including an antinepotism
policy, was established for the clerks, and that a Code of Evidence was
adopted by the Court.
It would take more than this issue of the Law Review even to sum-
marize the enormous achievements of Bob Murphy. Underlying it all,
however, is a very special person-a humble soul with keen insights
into human nature and the ways of the world, who has a marvelous
sense of history and an encyclopedic interest, who is as conversant
with the works of Willa Cather and John Steinbeck as with those of
judges and lawyers, and, most important, who embodies everything-
eveything-subsumed in the notions of decency and integrity: a
scholar, a doer, and, in the jargon of East European Gaelic-a mensch.
Tim MURPHY YEARS: A VIEW FROM THE TRIAL COURT
DENNIS M. SWEENEY*
Every morning across Maryland for the past eighteen years, a
now-familiar chant can be heard in county circuit criminal courts.
Trial judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and courtroom clerks ask
each other: "Do we have a Hicks problem?" "Will the defendant waive
Hicks?" "What is the Hicks date?"
Hicks refers to the opinion in State v. Hicks,1 wherein ChiefJudge
Robert C. Murphy, speaking for the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
held that statutory and rule provisions that required trial of a criminal
case within four months from the date of arraignment or appearance
of defense counsel in the case were mandatory and not merely direc-
tory, as had been held earlier by the Court of Appeals2 and Court of
Special Appeals.'
Chief Judge Murphy was blunt in spelling out in plain language
that the Court of Appeals now meant its rule to be followed even if it
* Associate Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Maryland.
1. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
2. See Young v. State, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972) (per curiam).
3. See Young v. State, 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137 (1972).
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resulted in the dismissal of serious criminal charges. "The provisions
of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecu-
tion and defense alike; they are not mere guides or bench marks to be
observed, if convenient."4 In explaining the need for mandatory ap-
plication, Chief Judge Murphy characteristically relied on the elo-
quence of others. He quoted at length Judge Jerold Powers in
Guarnera v. State,' who wrote:
Courts and court supporting services spend substantial time
'spinning their wheels', in rescheduling cases. Available
court time is lost. The time of attorneys and witnesses is lost.
Witnesses themselves are lost. Those who are not are put to
severe inconvenience as well as actual loss, and end up in
despair at the frustrations of being involved in the trial of a
case in the courts. The very image of the judicial system is in
serious jeopardy. Public confidence in the courts as instru-
ments of the people is impaired. Judges and lawyers cannot
blame the 'system', for they are the people who run that
system. 6
The Hicks opinion reflects in many ways the values Chief Judge
Murphy brought to his opinions and the administration of justice. It
relies on a court rule adopted to implement an enactment of the Gen-
eral Assembly, thereby recognizing that both the legislative and judi-
cial branches have significant roles to play in the administration of
criminal justice. Chief Judge Murphy did not hesitate to overrule or
distinguish precedent to accomplish the result needed for a modem
judicial system. He also relied on policy considerations that went be-
yond whether a rule could be characterized as pro-defendant or pro-
prosecution. He took the broader view and considered the impact of
the holding on the bench, the bar, the victims of crime and other
witnesses, and, finally, on the public's confidence in the courts.
Cases like Hicks and the rule modifications by the Court of Ap-
peals that evolve from them are the work tools of trial judges. We look
to the appellate courts and particularly the Court of Appeals to give us
useful implements that are forged from common sense, practical reali-
ties, and, indeed, justice. This Article examines the illustrious career
of Judge Robert C. Murphy from that perspective.
It is perhaps a dangerous exercise for a trial judge to comment
on the career and opinions of an appellate judge-particularly the
4. Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.
5. 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 243 (1974).
6. Hicks, 285 Md. at 317, 403 A.2d at 359 (quoting Guamera, 20 Md. App. at 573, 318
A.2d at 248-49).
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chief judge of the state's highest appellate court. The professional
relationship between trial and appellate judges can be at times a tense
and tricky one. Trial judges often make their decisions under the
pressure of the clock and with only the most sketchy legal informa-
tion. With experience, trial judges learn that their work is as much
intuition as it is scholarship of the law. They feel anyone can make
the "right" decision when they have fully researched all the prece-
dents and authorities. A good trial judge, on the other hand, can and
must make the "right" decision even when the judge has only been
provided the barest information or authority upon which to operate.
After all, this is what 'judgment" is about.
Trial judges see themselves as the artists of the judiciary, shaping
and molding a dynamic trial to its unknown verdict with an appear-
ance of authority, certitude, and fairness. Unfortunately, this marvel-
ous creation may last only until its first review by an appellate court.
From the trial judge's peculiar perspective, appellate judges are
not artists but are more akin to grim legal technicians. When appel-
late judges receive the case, it is no longer dynamic. It is a stale and
cold record to be autopsied by those on the negative mission of
searching for "error." The words of the trial judge that seemed so
wise and clear at the time of ruling now appear as inarticulate and
ungrammatical grunts. Little of the ambiance or nuance of the trial
appears on the page.
Working with this record, the appellate judge can dissect and
parse the trial judge's words that now lie so awkwardly upon the tran-
script. A gaggle of law review-trained clerks can spend endless hours
researching by computer the decisions from around the country. The
appellate judge, again assisted by the eager law clerks, can then take
the time needed to draft an exquisite decision demonstrating with
endless citations and reams of lifeless prose the clear error committed
by the trial judge. For ironic emphasis, the appellate opinion may
archly refer to "the learned trial judge" just prior to demonstrating in
painful detail the judge's obvious deficiencies in legal aptitude, learn-
ing, and reasoning. The final indignity is the return of the trial
judge's tattered masterpiece for a retrial, this time to be conducted
under the careful tutelage of the higher court's authoritative opinion.
This admittedly biased view of the role and function of appellate
judges might suggest that Chief Judge Murphy, who never served as a
trial judge,7 would not be viewed favorably by trial judges. This is not
7. Until the ratification of a constitutional amendment in 1944, the judges of the
Court of Appeals, with the exception of the judge from Baltimore City, performed both
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so. He brought to his review of trial work and management of trial
judges the perfect balance and sensitivity that produced learned and
useful opinions and highly practical policies.
ChiefJudge Murphy's opinions are precise and concise. They tell
readers-busy trial judges and harried litigators-what they need to
know, without confusing the issue with unnecessary musings or wan-
derings down arcane pathways that may be of interest to scholars but
of little use to practitioners. In a memorial to an earlier chiefjudge,
William L. Henderson, the distinguished Circuit Judge David Ross
quoted another trial judge who complimented the deceased jurist's
opinions by saying: "'I always liked his opinions. He set out the facts
succinctly, then the issue, the law and the holding. No references to
Alice-in-Wonderland or quotations from the Bible. Just good, solid
legal writing.'" 8
Another speaker at the same memorial, former Chief Judge Hall
Hammond, described Chief Judge Henderson's opinion writing by
saying:
There was no prolix profundity, no scissors and paste for
quotation after quotation and ladder after ladder of cases.
The opinions did not wander into side streets or alleys of the
law and did not meander through the meadows of generali-
ties and restatements of the obvious. With grace of concept
and felicity of phrase they took the high road to the right
destination.'
These descriptions neatly encapsulate the legal writing style of Chief
Judge Murphy. Direct and held to the point, the opinions speak with
strength and clarity. They are immediately accessible to the reader
and devoid of egotistical flourishes or florid eloquence. In short, they
are the type of opinions appreciated by a busy trial judge with little
time to read and digest the sometimes overwhelming flood of appel-
late opinions that land on the judge's desk with a heavy thud.
The variety of Chief Judge Murphy's opinions can be seen by
looking at the entire span of his judicial career, as other contributors
to this issue have done. It can also be seen by looking at any single
trial and appellate duties, mixing the practical realities of trial work with the scholarship of
appellate opinions. There was a vigorous debate among the members of the bench and
bar about the wisdom of the change. See William C. Walsh, The Movement to Reorganize the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 6 MD. L. REv. 119 (1942).
8. In Memoriam: Memorial Services for the Honorable William L. Henderson, Chief Judge
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 300 Md. XXXIX, XLV (1984) (memorial address presented by
the Honorable David Ross).
9. Id. at XLIII (memorial address presented by the Honorable Hall Hammond).
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volume of the Maryland Reports. Volume 340 of the Maryland Re-
ports, for example, contains the opinions for approximately one quar-
ter of 1995. In that volume, Chief Judge Murphy authored eight
opinions on a wide array of important subjects. They include issues of
double jeopardy as applied to motor vehicle law prosecutions,'" the
effect of incarceration on a parent's obligation to pay child support,1
the rights of the media to publish information obtained in juvenile
court proceedings,1 2 the validity of a real estate contract that failed to
disclose a disclaimer required by statute,13 the tax status of computer
equipment used to prepare financial information on CD-ROMs, 4 the
obligation of an insurer to defend a party in a lead poisoning claim,' 5
the level of proof required in a building encroachment case, 1 6 and the
standards for a tort claim involving only economic loss in a home-
owner's suit against plywood manufacturers for alleged defects in resi-
dential roofs.' 7
Not only did Chief Judge Murphy write on a remarkable array of
subjects in this volume, he also carried the entire Court with him
unanimously in all opinions he wrote except one.' 8 In that same vol-
ume, which contains seventy-five opinions by other members of the
Court, Chief Judge Murphy wrote no dissents or concurrences and
joined in only one dissent.' 9
Dissents by Chief Judge Murphy are rare. For example, in 149
cases with opinions decided in 1991, Chief Judge Murphy wrote no
dissents and joined in none. While some judges see frequent dissents
as a duty, "an appeal... to the intelligence of a future day,"20 other
commentators note that the practice of frequent dissents is a relatively
modem phenomenon that detracts from the institutional authority of
10. See State v.Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1265
(1996).
11. See Wills v.Jones, 340 Md. 480, 667 A.2d 331 (1995).
12. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 667 A.2d 166 (1995).
13. See Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 668 A.2d 1 (1995).
14. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Disclosure, Inc., 340 Md. 675, 667 A.2d 910
(1995).
15. See Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995).
16. See Urban Site Venture II Ltd. Partnership v. Levering Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 340
Md. 223, 665 A.2d 1062 (1995).
17. See Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995).
18. See id. Judge Eldridge dissented, joined by Judges Bell and Raker. See id. at 547
(Eldridge, J., dissenting).
19. See Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 668, 667 A.2d 898, 906 (1995)
(Raker, J., dissenting). In this case, ChiefJudge Murphy joined Judge Raker's dissent on
an issue of practical court procedure-the timing of a show cause order in a forfeiture
case. See id.
20. CHARLEs EvANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
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the Court.21 Clearly, Chief Judge Murphy recognized the value of ob-
taining consensus and, where feasible, producing opinions that speak
with the authority of the entire institution. This provides for stability
and certainty in the law-a great comfort to the trial judge and to
those directly and indirectly affected by the Court's decisions.2 2
This is not to say that ChiefJudge Murphy could not dissent with
force and conviction when he thought it necessary. In Schochet v.
State,2" the majority held that in order to avoid a constitutional ques-
tion, a very explicit statute 4 outlawing fellatio could be construed so
that it did not encompass consensual, noncommercial heterosexual
activity between adults in the privacy of the home.
Amazed at the legerdemain of the majority's reasoning, Chief
Judge Murphy noted that the statute was enacted in 1916, "a staid
time in our history when the sexual mores of the people were far less
tolerant than the moral attitudes that prevail in today's society." 5 He
could find in the starkly precise words of the statute no exceptions, no
possibility of two reasonable interpretations.
As to the constitutional question of a right to privacy, ChiefJudge
Murphy relied on the detailed reasoning of Judge Charles E. Moylan,
Jr., in the majority opinion of the Court of Special Appeals26 to find
the statute constitutional. 7 Finally, as he has so often done through-
out his career, ChiefJudge Murphy saw the proper method for chang-
ing outmoded statutes to be not well-intentioned judicial blue-
penciling but reliance on the legislative branch "as the elected repre-
21. See id. (noting that Chief Justice John Marshall dissented only nine times in his
thirty-five-year career).
22. The disease of dissent has spread from the opinion-rendering function of the
Court of Appeals to now infect the Court's rulemaking. For example, the recent rewrite of
the contempt rules was adopted by a five-to-two vote. See 344 Md. XLVII (1996). When the
Court cannot reach consensus on such basic matters ofjudicial administration, the Court's
institutional authority is unfortunately weakened.
23. 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990).
24. Article 27, section 554 of the Maryland Annotated Code provides:
Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her mouth the sexual
organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing his or
her sexual organ in the mouth of any other person or animal, or who shall be
convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted sexual practice with
any other person or animal, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000.00), or be imprisoned in jail or in the house of correction or in the peni-
tentiary for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall be both fined and impris-
oned within the limits above prescribed in the discretion of the court
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996).
25. Schochet, 320 Md. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
26. See Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (1988).
27. Schochet, 320 Md. at 737, 580 A.2d at 187 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
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sentatives of the people, and as the primary body which declares the
public policy of this State."28
It is not surprising that Chief Judge Murphy came to decide and
write as he did. Like his predecessors, Chief Judges Hammond and
Henderson, Chief Judge Murphy served a lengthy apprenticeship in
the Office of the Attorney General. In a decade in that office, he rose
from Special Assistant Attorney General to Deputy Attorney General,
and then he briefly served as Attorney General.
One of the duties of any Assistant Attorney General is to draft
Opinions of the Attorney General that are hopefully correct, but also
are clear, devoid of unnecessary verbiage, and, most important,
promptly issued. While there may be lively debate and disagreement
among those writing and reviewing the draft opinions, the Attorney
General speaks with one voice. There are no dissents.
Likely, the first published legal work of Robert C. Murphy is the
lead opinion in Volume 44 of Official Opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral, in which Special Assistant Attorney General Robert Murphy,
barely six months on the job, answers a question concerning the use
of confessed judgment notes in sales under the Retail Installment
Sales Act. 9 The opinion is five paragraphs long, containing fourteen
sentences, and cites only two cases. It authoritatively and clearly an-
swers the question, but does not burden the requesting official or
other readers with any unnecessary verbiage. One can see in this early
opinion the embryonic style that would mature over the next thirty-
seven years.
Chief Judge Murphy's service in the Attorney General's Office is
also pivotal to understanding'his approach to the law. The Maryland
Attorney General not only represents all three branches of Maryland
government; the Attorney General also exercises an often effectively
final authority on many questions of law affecting the executive and
legislative branches of government through opinions issued under Ar-
ticle V, section 3(a) (4) of the Maryland Constitution.
Such a tension-filled task requires that the Attorney General be a
scrupulous arbiter of the issues, respectful of the prerogatives and
powers of both the executive and legislative branches. The Attorney
General often must find the middle course-the practical and credi-
ble compromise which, while faithful to the law, does not undermine
the rightful role of either branch of government.
28. Id at 738, 580 A.2d at 187.
29. See 44 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1959).
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When he moved from Attorney General to Chief Judge of the
Court of Special Appeals and then to Chief Judge of the Court of Ap-
peals, Chief Judge Murphy brought with him and employed that
heightened sensitivity to both the separation of powers and the need
to avoid needless constitutional confrontations among the branches.
This legacy can been seen in Murphy opinions such as Fogle v. H & G
Restaurant, Inc.,"° in which aggressive executive branch regulations
prohibiting workplace smoking were upheld, and Kelly v. Marylanders
for Sports Sanity, Inc.,1 in which an intricate legislative scheme for
funding and siting new sports stadiums was held to be nonreferable.3 2
When he became chief, Chief Judge Murphy claims that his pred-
ecessor gave the following advice about fulfilling the chiefjudge's role
as constitutional administrative head of the judicial branch of state
government. "Put all your time and effort into preparing solid legal
opinions. There's no time for anything else. Don't answer the phone.
Don't open your mail. All those problems will solve themselves if you
don't pay attention to them."3 1
Fortunately, Chief Judge Murphy ignored this advice. Without
slighting the preparation of "solid legal opinions," he jumped into the
then-nascent field of judicial administration. He brought to maturity
the Administrative Office of the Courts under a trained and profes-
sional staff of State Court Administrators. He oversaw the formation
of the Judicial Institute of Maryland, which provides excellent training
to trial judges and masters on an ongoing basis. ChiefJudge Murphy
also began the at-times painful process of bringing the courts into a
world of computer technology. All of this administration and supervi-
sion was done without impairing in any way the independence and
professionalism of the judges under him.
What trial judges know intuitively about the manner in which
Chief Judge Murphy "managed" them was recently confirmed in a
year-long study by the Commission on the Future of Maryland Courts,
a thirty-one member group created by the General Assembly. After
the study, the Commission evaluated the present court system, stating:
30. 337 Md. 441, 654 A-2d 449 (1995).
31. 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987).
32. In both cases, the Court of Appeals reversed the rulings of the trial judges, but the
Murphy opinions did so with great respect for the careful findings and conclusions ex-
pressed by the trial judge and with absolutely no references to the Bible, the Magna Carta,
or Alice in Wonderland, and only a single Latin phrase (in pari materia) appears in either
opinion.
33. State Court Profiles: Robert C. Murphy, ChiefJudge, Maryland Court of Appeals, CENTER
COURT (National Center for State Courts), Fall/Winter 1996, at 8.
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Our conclusion is that Maryland is, and has been, blessed
with one of the finest judiciaries in the United States. It con-
sists of hardworking, diligent and honorable people in both
its judicial and non-judicial ranks. It has been well managed
and, generally, it holds the confidence of the General Assem-
bly, the Executive, and the people.3 4
This is a high compliment to ChiefJudge Murphy's stewardship and a
wonderful legacy to his successor.
Chief Judge Murphy's approach to directing trial judges outside
of his opinions was characteristically low key and respectful of their
independence. Still, a point could be made when necessary. When I
was newly appointed to the circuit court bench in 1991, a memoran-
dum came from Chief Judge Murphy addressed to "all trial judges,"
but it seemed particularly aimed at me, with towering stacks of cases
on my credenza, each awaiting in turn an opportunity for me to re-
search and write the perfect opinion.
This memorandum, written with the concurrence of my
fellow Judges of the Court of Appeals, is to remind all trial
judges in the State of one cardinal principle upon which
most lawyers and all appellate judges agree, i.e., that busy
trial judges do not have the time, nor are they expected, to
write elaborate opinions in cases held sub curia. It is far
more important that trial judges decide cases within a rea-
sonable time than it is to unduly delay a decision pending
completion of a definitive treatise on the issues presented.
Nothing causes litigants and their lawyers more grief,
and the judicial branch of government more criticism, than
failure of trial judges to decide cases on a reasonably prompt
basis.
This simple directive, delivered in a modest and nonauthoritarian
tone but persuasively reasoned, caused me promptly to eliminate my
backlog. It still sits on my desk-a constant reminder of the role the
trial judge plays in our system of justice.
A memorable achievement of the Murphy years is the establish-
ment and maintenance of a state judiciary of the highest integrity. It
was not always so in Maryland. At the dawn of the Murphy era, two
district court judges were removed for disposing of parking ticket
cases on the basis of friendship or political favoritism when they
served on the old Municipal Court of Baltimore City."3 The Commis-
sion on Judicial Disabilities had found that such practices were "en-
34. Final Report, The Commission on the Future of Maryland Courts (Dec. 15, 1996).
35. See In re Diener & Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973).
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demic" in the Municipal Court and potentially involved other judges
besides the two immediately before it. 6 In this case, the Commission
recommended censure for the judges because they did not profit
from the improper practices, and the practices were long-standing
customs of the Municipal Court. The court's harsher disposition of
removal sent a message to the judiciary that still resonates today-
abuse of judicial power or the office will not be tolerated. This cul-
ture was reinforced continually by the leadership and personal con-
duct of ChiefJudge Murphy, about whom there has never been even a
hint of impropriety. In this effort, he was greatly aided by his former
colleague and deputy in the attorney general's office, Robert F. Swee-
ney, who had been appointed the ChiefJudge of the District Court in
1971. Together, they spent virtually their entire legal careers in pub-
lic service, devoted to the law and the administration of practical
justice.
It has often been remarked that talented and ambitious Irish
Americans, foreclosed by discrimination in earlier years from many
business opportunities, gravitated for advancement to either the
Church or to public service in government or politics.3 7 It is not too
far-fetched to say that these two Irish Catholics from modest back-
grounds viewed the judiciary they headed as a secular priesthood in
which those who were called to wear the robes should bring to the
office the highest morals, integrity, and desire for public service.
When Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Taft attempted to
get the aged and irascible Justice Joseph McKenna to step down, he
was met with resistance. Justice McKenna told the Chief Justice that
"when a man retires, he disappears and nobody cares for him.""8
There is no danger that such a fate will befall Chief Judge Robert C.
Murphy in retirement. He is certainly the leading figure in the Mary-
land judiciary in the twentieth century. He will be long admired and
remembered, both for his legal acumen and his administrative innova-
tions and talents. His human concern for the judges under him and
the people of Maryland will ensure that Robert C. Murphy is cared
about for generations to come.
36. See id. at 670, 304 A.2d at 594.
37. See LAWRENCEJ. McCAFFREY, TEXTURES OF IRISH AMERICA 3-7 (1992).
38. SHELDON M. NovicK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
345 (1989).
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THE HEAD AND HEART OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: THE PUBLIC LAW
OPINIONS OF CHIEF JUDGE ROBERT C. MURPIIY
ROBERT A. ZARNOCH*
On October 9, 1972, several months after his elevation to Mary-
land's highest court, Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy delivered his first
opinion for the Court of Appeals. In Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections,' he concluded that, under Maryland common law, state elec-
tion officials could not deny a married woman the right to register to
vote in her maiden name if she had openly and consistently used that
name after her marriage.2 A dissent twice decried the majority opin-
ion as "judicial legislation."' Nearly a quarter century later, weighed
against a body of more than four hundred reported Court of Appeals
opinions, the charge of legislating seems particularly ill-suited to de-
scribe the decisions of Chief Judge Murphy.4 In fact, few Maryland
jurists have drawn a firmer or more responsible line between the deci-
sionmaking ofjudges and the policymaking characteristic of the legis-
lative and democratic processes. This was a lesson I learned early in
my 1974-75 clerkship, after Chief Judge Murphy had applied the fin-
ishing touches to his opinion in In re Trader.5 The 1974 term was the
first time a member of the Court was authorized to have two law
clerks. Now all judges on the Court have two. My cohort that year was
Thomas E. Plank, who now teaches at the University of Tennessee Col-
lege of Law.
Trader involved an equal protection challenge to statutory provi-
sions that accorded juvenile offenders more favorable treatment in
Montgomery County than in other portions of the State. In a long
opinion, ChiefJudge Murphy disposed of the constitutional challenge
largely on the basis of the governing "lenient review" equal protection
* Assistant Attorney General, Counsel to the General Assembly, State of Maryland.
1. 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).
2. Although constitutional issues were raised in Stuart, the case was decided on non-
constitutional grounds. Id. at 450, 295 A.2d at 228. The decision was handed down a few
months after the General Assembly had proposed an Equal Rights Amendment and little
more than a month before the voters approved it. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RrS. art. 46.
On an amicus curiae brief for the American Civil Liberties Union was Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
3. Stuart, 266 Md. at 451, 455, 295 A.2d at 228, 231.
4. For legal scholars like Justice Benjamin Cardozo, "judicial legislation" was not an
epithet but an accurate description of the creative process ofjudicial decisionmaking. See
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 113, 115 (1921). As a practi-
cal matter, it is also fairly descriptive of the work product of the Court of Appeals, which
has the power to declare and alter the State's common law and to promulgate Court rules
that have the force of law.
5. 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).
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standard, the absence of a suitable record, deference to the legisla-
ture, and a jurisdictional defect in one of the appeals. 6 His opinion
carried a stern warning, however, that all such territorial distinctions
involving juvenile offenders would not pass constitutional muster.7
Clearly troubled by the issues raised in Trader and not satisfied with
simply a shot across the legislative bow, Chief Judge Murphy mobil-
ized and worked with the governor's office to develop legislation to
remedy the alleged infirmities in the juvenile system and in a sense to
"override" the Chief Judge's own opinion. Although not an easy vic-
tory, an administration measure was enacted at the 1975 session of the
General Assembly "creating a uniform law for Juvenile Causes."8
Trader and its aftermath illustrate that Chief Judge Murphy was
one of "those rare judges who possess both head and a heart,"9 and
that he was obviously mindful of Justice Felix Frankfurter's admoni-
tion that appellate judges "first and foremost" bring to their task
"humility and an understanding of the range of the problems and of
their own inadequacy in dealing with them.""0
This is also apparent from two well-known Murphy opinions from
1983. In Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education," the Chief
Judge's thorough opinion rejecting a state constitutional challenge to
Maryland's scheme for financing public school education among the
subdivisions ended with a frank concession of disparities in funding
and opportunities. 2 Chief Judge Murphy noted, however, that "it is
not within the power or province of members of the Judiciary to ad-
vance their own personal wishes or to implement their own personal
notions of fairness under the guise of constitutional interpretation"
and urged that the legislature was the proper forum to address the
disparities. Obviously spurred in part by the conclusion of the school
funding litigation, the governor and General Assembly in 1984 ap-
proved the largest five-year increase in state aid to education in
Maryland history." In Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Educa-
6. Id. at 399-402, 325 A.2d at 417-18.
7. Id. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418.
8. SeeAct of May 15, 1975, ch. 554, 1975 Md. Laws 2670. Much of the difficult crafting
of Chapter 554 and the negotiating of its passage was done by Alan Wilner, then-Chief
Legislative Officer of the Governor. Also testifying in support of the measure was then-
State Court Administrator, William Adkins. Both later served on the Court of Appeals.
9. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 314 (1958).
10. Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 905 (1953).
11. 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
12. Id. at 658, 458 A.2d at 790.
13. See Act of May 8, 1984, ch. 85, 1984 Md. Laws 438. Of course, the Hornbeck decision
was not the last legal word on the issue of the adequacy of state educational funding oppor-
tunities. In Montgomeiy County v. Bradford, 342 Md. 175, 691 A.2d 1281 (1997), the Court of
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tion,'4 the Chief Judge, relying in large part on sixteen years of Gen-
eral Assembly rejection of comparative fault bills and the difficulties in
judicially defining a new standard, declined a request to modify the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence. He said that "[i] n
the final analysis, whether to abandon the doctrine of contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence involves fundamental
and basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed by the
legislature."15 Although, unlike Hornbeck, there was no immediate fall-
out from this decision, more than a dozen years later the issue of
whether the General Assembly should adopt comparative fault is a
question weighed with increasing seriousness each session.
A number of Murphy opinions that will be long cited are those
upholding significant or controversial executive or legislative action. 16
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to regard Chief Judge Murphy as
an unhesitant supporter of either government or the status quo or as
one merely satisfied with a gentle prod of government in the right
direction. For every Harrison there is an Adler v. American Standard
Corp.17 For every Hornbeck there is a Williams v. Wilzack"8 or a Rand v.
Appeals affirmed a decision denying Montgomery County the right to intervene in educa-
tional adequacy and funding litigation in Baltimore City that was eventually settled by a
consent decree subject to legislative approval. Now retired and specially assigned, Judge
Murphy authored the decision for the Court and provided the swing vote for the 4-3 major-
ity. Most observers would agree that if the appellate Court had ordered intervention and
upset the consent decree, the General Assembly at its 1997 session would not have enacted
legislation pledging $254 million in school aid for Baltimore City and restructuring the
Baltimore City School Board. See Act of April 8, 1997, ch. 105, 1997 Md. Laws 1529.
14. 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983).
15. Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905.
16. See, e.g., Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995) (work-
place smoking regulations); Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. Schaefer, 325 Md. 19,
599 A.2d 91 (1991) (executive order setting forty-hour work week for state employees);
Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 532 A.2d 1056 (1987) (vehicle emission
program); Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987)
(excepting from referendum legislation funding for the building of Oriole Park at Cam-
den Yards). In Maryland Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 367 A.2d 491
(1977), a landmark legislative-executive conflict over mandated spending, the ChiefJudge
sided with the General Assembly and dissented from the majority holding in favor of the
governor. See id. at 153-63, 367 A.2d at 502-07 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting). In 1978, the
Constitution was amended to authorize the legislature to mandate that the governor in-
clude funding in a budget. See Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 971, 1978 Md. Laws 2811.
17. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (altering Maryland's common law to recognize a
cause of action for abusive discharge), answer conformed to, 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982),
aff'd in part and revd in part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
18. 319 Md. 485, 573 A.2d 809 (1990) (holding that statute providing for involuntary
medication of mental patients violated due process).
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Rand.19 Most revealing are Chief Judge Murphy's decisions in two ar-
eas of public law: First Amendment cases and death penalty litigation.
Like another chiefjurist who often mistakenly seemed universally
identified with conservative and government positions-Chief Justice
Warren Burger-Chief Judge Murphy was a staunch and consistent
defender of free speech interests.2" In Baltimore Sun Co. v. State 1 and
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert,22 Chief Judge Murphy upheld the right of
the news media to obtain access to various judicial proceedings. In
Baltimore Sun Co. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.,23 he
wrote that a newspaper could not be denied the right to see confiden-
tial records of a hospital peer review committee that were discoverable
in a civil suit. In Rosenberg v. Helinski 4 and Miner v. Novotny,25 the
Chief Judge gave a broad reading to defamation privileges-in the
first case a psychologist's "fair report" of his in-court testimony, in the
second, a complainant's communications of police brutality. In State
v. Sheldon,26 he voted to invalidate the State's cross burning law as vio-
lative of free speech, and in Curran v. Price,27 he stopped in its tracks
Maryland's "Son of Sam" law, which prevented criminal defendants
from profiting from literary or other "reenactments" of their crimes.
Commercial speech interests were advanced in Comprehensive Account-
ing Service Co. v. Maryland State Board of Public Accountancy,28 in which
Chief Judge Murphy concluded that the State could not prevent non-
CPAs from advertising themselves as accountants. Speech by public
employees was upheld against attempted removals in DiGrazia v.
County Executive29 and De Bleecker v. Montgomery County.3 °
19. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977) (holding that Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
prevents gender from being a factor in allocating responsibility for child support awards).
Rand remains the Court's broadest reading of the ERA. See id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-
05. It had been regarded by some as standing for the proposition that the ERA is absolute
and that a gender-based classification can never be justified. See 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 173, 283
(1983). State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 554 A.2d 366 (1989), however, makes
it clear that "strict scrutiny" is the appropriate test under Maryland's ERA.
20. See MichaelJ. Wahoske, ChiefJustice Burger and Freedom of the Press, 45 OKLA. L. REv.
121 (1992).
21. 340 Md. 437, 667 A.2d 166 (1995).
22. 323 Md. 290, 593 A.2d 224 (1991).
23. 321 Md. 659, 584 A.2d 683 (1991).
24. 328 Md. 664, 616 A.2d 866 (1992).
25. 304 Md. 164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985).
26. 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993).
27. 334 Md. 149, 638 A.2d 93 (1994).
28. 284 Md. 474, 397 A.2d 1019 (1979).
29. 288 Md. 437, 418 A.2d 1911 (1980).
30. 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982).
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Even cases that were not immediate media victories contained the
patented Murphy shot across the bow. For example, in City of New
Carrollton v. Rogers,"1 the first decision interpreting the State's Open
Meetings Law, Chief Judge Murphy, speaking for the Court, over-
turned a finding of a violation of the law by city officials, but noted:
Of course, to give notice of a meeting of the public
body, and then intentionally prevent the public from attend-
ing, would constitute a gross violation of the Act, as the trial
judge held. Indeed, any action taken by the public body
which discourages public attendance at the meeting to any
substantial degree would likely violate the Act's provisions.
The locking of doors, for example, even for legitimate secur-
ity purposes, would normally violate the Act's provisions.32
Similarly, in Avara v. Baltimore News American Division,3" the Chief
Judge concluded that the jurisdictional provisions of the Open Meet-
ings Law did not permit a suit against a conference committee of the
General Assembly considering the Budget Bill. At the same time,
however, he concluded that the law applied to the committee-a con-
clusion that has ensured open budget conference committee delibera-
tions for the last fifteen years.3 4
In capital cases, while neither morally nor philosophically op-
posed to the death penalty, Chief Judge Murphy vacated a number of
death sentences. In Bartholomey v. State,35 decided shortly after he
joined the Court, the Chief Judge held unconstitutional Maryland's
death penalty law. In the cases of Richard Danny Tichnell, on four
separate occasions, Murphy authored death penalty opinions, twice
vacating the death sentence.3 6
31. 287 Md. 56, 410 A.2d 1070 (1980).
32. Id. at 69, 410 A.2d at 1077.
33. 292 Md. 543, 440 A.2d 368 (1982).
34. Two notable exceptions to Chief Judge Murphy's generally sympathetic view of
First Amendment issues were WBAL-TVDivision, Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233, 477 A-2d
776 (1984), which allowed state prosecutors to have access to an unbroadcast videotape of
an interview with a criminal defendant, and Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465 A.2d 413
(1983), which upheld a decision requiring a reporter to testify before a grand jury about
information obtained from a confidential source.
35. 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972).
36. See State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179 (1986); Tichnell v. State, 297 Md.
432, 468 A.2d 1 (1983); Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981); Tichnell v.
State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980). After each successive Tichnell decision, it must
have been more and more difficult for the ChiefJudge to open the case file. Perhaps the
only other series of cases that so preoccupied the ChiefJudge was original action redistrict-
ing litigation, in which he authored three decades worth of decisions for the Court. See
Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993); In re Legislative District-
ing, 299 Md. 658, 475 A.2d 428 (1982); In re Legislative Districting, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d
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Chief Judge Murphy may have had his Tichnell experience in
mind when in 1991 he invited a stunned General Assembly
to assess the worth and effectiveness of your 1978 capital
punishment statute, in light of its extraordinarily high costs,
the difficulties so readily apparent in its constitutional imple-
mentation, and the countless hours committed by prosecu-
tors, public defenders, and the courts to the trial of these
cases-hours that might be more productively devoted to the
trial of violent, noncapital felony offenses.3
7
Two public law oddities that marked Chief Judge Murphy's ser-
vice on the Court of Appeals, unfortunately to some degree, both in-
volved me. In Murphy v. Yates,"8 the Chief Judge was a party on the
losing side of a test suit he himself had encouraged to clear the way
(or close the door) to service by three judges on the State Prosecutor
Selection and Disabilities Commission. Fresh from my clerkship, I
now had my first appeal, and along with a host of able attorneys from
the Attorney General's Office, I defended my former employer. We
lost, and lost big. The Court (minus its leader) never reached the
esoteric dual office-holding issues that troubled Chief Judge Murphy,
but rather invalidated the whole State Prosecutor Law as an invasion
of the constitutional powers of the state's attorneys.-9
Another first for Chief Judge Murphy arose from his generous
decision to volunteer his Court of Appeals judges to each sit a month
on the Court of Special Appeals to cut down on a backlog. Not ex-
empt from this service, the Chief Judge took his turn on the interme-
diate appellate court, assisted by his two law clerks. In a case better
left unnamed, the Chief Judge, contrary to his wise and customary
practice, included in his opinion virtually every word I had drafted for
him-a grievous error in light of the fact that after certiorari was
granted, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision that carried the
name of its own Chief Judge.
While I may have regarded these incidents as disasters, I am sure
Chief Judge Murphy was bemused by them. I have never met a judge
477 (1974). Because of the ChiefJudge's practice of choosing a retired appellate judge to
serve as special master and to recommend a legislative redistricting decision to the Court
of Appeals, now-retired Judge Murphy may find himself involved in a fourth decade of
state legislative redistricting in the year 2002.
37. ChiefJudge Robert C. Murphy, State of the Judiciary Message to a Joint Session of
the General Assembly of Maryland, 321 Md. XXXIX, XLIX (Jan. 22, 1991).
38. 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975).
39. It took a constitutional amendment, see Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 545, 1976 Md.
Laws 1435, and new legislation, seeAct of May 17, 1976, ch. 612, 1976 Md. Laws 1695, to re-
create the Office of State Prosecutor.
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with a greater sense of humor. His many speeches rang with wit, ele-
gance, and eloquence. 4° In my view, he deliberately withheld these
features from his opinions. He did not mix judging and joking. His
opinions were workmanlike, precise factually, thorough in their analy-
sis of applicable law, respectful of the reader, and clear in their con-
clusions. There were no hidden messages. He felt a duty to provide
guidance. To the government, he dispensed admonitions and criti-
cism when warranted and praise when merited. In his public law
opinions, however, his humility and humanity shone through and usu-
ally led him down the right path. No better characterization of his
own contributions can be found than Chief Judge Murphy's capsula-
tion of the talents of his predecessor, the Honorable Hall Hammond:
"Maryland's most distinguished and eminentjurist, a man of such rare
endowment that his equal will likely not be encountered for many
generations to come."41
40. Several years ago, in a phone call, he related his desperate need for the precise
wording of the "there will be time" verse from T.S. Eliot's The Love Song ofJ. Alfred Prufrock
in order to describe in a speech a judge's excuses for tardy opinion writing.
41. In Memoriam: Honorable Hall Hammond, 326 Md. LXIII, LXXXV (1992).
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